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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that a
sentencing court may use conduct for which a defendant has been
acquitted, to enhance a sentence for conduct of which the defendant has
been convicted.' The holding, which resolved a split between the Ninth
Circuit and all other Circuits, arose from two Ninth Circuit cases, United
States v. Watts2 and United States v. Putra.3 In Watts, the government
indicted the defendant for possessing cocaine base with the intent to dis-
tribute, and for using a firearm in connection with a drug offense.' A
jury convicted him on the narcotics charge, but acquitted him on the
weapons charge.5 In Putra, the government indicted the defendant on
two counts of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. The first count involved one ounce of cocaine. The second
count involved five ounces of cocaine.6 The jury convicted the defend-
ant on the first count, but acquitted her on the second.7 In both Watts
and Putra, the district court used the acquitted conduct to enhance the
defendants' sentences.' In both cases, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
1. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
2. United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995).
3. United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).
4. See Watts, 67 F.3d at 793.
5. See id.
6. See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1387.
7. See id. at 1388.
8. In Watts, the district court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to section
2D 1. I(b)(1) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to enhance Watts' base offense level by two levels.
See Watts. 67 F.3d at 797-98; U.S. SE rENCINGGrDEUNES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(b)(l) (1995)
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remanded, holding it to be improper for sentencing judges to use facts
rejected by the jury through its acquittal, for purposes of sentence
enhancement.9 On a single petition for certiorari, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decisions."' In its con-
solidated decision in United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court held that
a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from
considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that
conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence."
In rendering its 7-2 per curiam decision, the Court ostensibly reiter-
ated the principle expressed in Williams v. New York, 2 and codified in
18 U.S.C. § 3661: "No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person con-
victed of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."1 3
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court's Watts decision and its
implications for the future of judicial discretion in criminal sentencing.
Part I provides a contextual look at the language, history, and structural
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part II examines
the Ninth Circuit's solitary interpretation of the Guidelines as presented
by their decisions in Watts and Putra. Part III examines the Supreme
Court majority's interpretation of the Guidelines in the context of 18
U.S.C. § 3661, the plain language of the Guidelines themselves, and
Williams and other precedent bearing on that interpretation. Part IV cri-
tiques the majority decision in light of Justices Scalia's and Breyer's
concurrences, and Justices Stevens' and Kennedy's dissents. Part V
highlights the extent to which the majority's decision is irreconcilable
with the purposes of the federal criminal system, as embodied in the
presumption of innocence and constitutional due process. Ultimately,
Part VI condemns the pragmatic implications of handing over fact-find-
ing discretion to prosecutors and judges under the guise of "sentencing."
[hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines applies where "a
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed" during the offense of conviction.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, at § 2D1.1(b)(l); see also Watts, 67 F.3d at 796 (citing same
provision). In Putra, the sentencing court determined that the preponderance of the evidence
showed that Putra aided and abetted on two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1387.
9. See Watts, 67 F.3d at 797-98; Putra, 78 F.3d at 1388-89 (upholding United States v.
Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991)).
10. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 638 (1997).
11. See id.
12. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994).
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HI. LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND STRUCTURAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In October, 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act which incorporated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.14 The
Sentencing Guidelines promulgated thereunder took effect in 1987,
under the direction of the United States Sentencing Commission. 15 In
enacting the Guidelines, Congress sought truth16 and proportionality 17 in
sentencing. Moreover, it aimed at producing uniformity and predictabil-
ity"8 by reducing the broad sentencing discretion of judges, who were
giving out disparate sentences for convictions involving substantially the
same circumstances. 19
Under the current Sentencing Guidelines, sentences are based, not
so much upon a defendant's actual conduct, but upon conduct that con-
stitutes the elements of the offense for which he is charged and con-
victed. In other words, the current system is a charge-offense system to
the extent that the offense for which the defendant is convicted secures
the base offense level in the Sentencing Guidelines.2" However, the cur-
14. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017, which
contains the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1994)). For a
basic description of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and a summary of their historical
development, see Michael K. Forde, Note, The Exclusionary Rule at Sentencing: New Life Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 33 Am. CRim. L. REV. 379, 386 (1996); Joshua M. Weber,
Note, United States v. Brady: Should Sentencing Courts Reconsider Disputed Acquitted Conduct
for Enhancement Purposes Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 46 ARK. L. REV. 457, 459-
63 (1993); William J. Kirchner, Note, Punishment Despite Acquittal: An Unconstitutional Aspect
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 799, 800-03 (1992).
15. 132 CONG. REc. H3278-02 (daily ed. June 3, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino); see also
Jason Ebe, Note, Witte v. United States: Conduct May Be Considered for Multiple Punishments
Without Violating Double Jeopardy, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 1279, 1280-83 (1995) (delineating the
Commission's responsibilities).
16. Congress sought to promote honesty in sentencing by eliminating indeterminate sentences
and disempowering the parole commission from significantly reducing how much of that sentence
the offender actually served. See Ebe, supra note 15, at 1281; Forde, supra note 14, at 386.
17. Congress sought proportionality in sentencing by imposing appropriately different
sentences for different criminal conduct of varying severity. See Ebe, supra note 15, at 1281;
Forde, supra note 14, at 386.
18. 133 CONG. REc. E3608-02 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Synar of
Oklahoma).
19. The professed purpose of the Guidelines was to: "provide certainty and fairness in ...
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994). "Imposition of
a sentence:
(a) factors to be considered in imposing a sentence...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994). See also 132 CONG.
Rc. H3278-02 (daily ed. June 3, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
20. See Kirchner, supra note 14:
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rent system is also a compromised charge system incorporating real-
offense sentencing,21 in that the Sentencing Guidelines require judges to
consider the defendant's actual conduct in carrying out his crime,
regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted.22
Accordingly, Sentencing Guidelines Section lB 1.3(a) lists the following
as "relevant conduct" in determining the applicable base level and con-
comitant guideline range for purposes of sentencing:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant;
and
(B) ... all reasonable foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of... jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred
during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation of
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense;
(2) . . . all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from . . . and all harm that was the
object of such acts and omissions ....
In determining the appropriate guideline range, the "relevant conduct"
context in section lB1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines directs judges to
take into account the manner in which the criminal defendant carried out
the crime of conviction. 4 What section lB1.3 leaves unresolved is the
The offense for which the defendant was convicted (the "charge offense") forms the
starting point or "base level offense." The judge then evaluates other relevant
conduct committed by the offender (the "real offense" element of the system) to
determine if enhancement or reduction of the offense level is warranted. The
"combined adjusted offense level" thus reflects a blend of these two elements.
Id. at 80 (citations omitted). See also Ebe, supra note 15, at 1281-82; Forde, supra note 14, at
386.
21. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at § IBI.3; see also Barry L. Johnson, If at
First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75
N.C. L. REv. 153, 159-62 (1996) (discussing relevant conduct and real-offense sentencing under
the Guidelines); Forde, supra note 14, at 386 (same); Ebe, supra note 15, at 1282 (same).
22. The Guidelines generally direct judges to: (1) locate the statute of conviction; (2)
determine the base offense level; (3) add specific characteristics; (4) add adjustments; (5) calculate
a criminal history score; (6) determine the sentence within the Sentencing Table; and (7) impose a
guideline sentence, or, under unusually mitigating or aggravating circumstances, depart from and
impose a non-Guideline sentence. See Ebe, supra note 15, at 1282; see also Johnson, supra note
21, at 158-59 (discussing sentencing process); Kirchner, supra note 14, at 801-03 (same).
23. SErTcINo GUmELNEs, supra note 8, at § lB1.3(a) (emphasis added).
24. See also id. § 1B1.3 commentary, at 17:
The principles and limits of sentencing accountability under this guideline are not
always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability ... the focus is on
the specific acts and omissions for which the defendant is to be held accountable in
determining the applicable guideline range, rather than on whether the defendant is
criminally liable for an offense as a principal, accomplice, or conspirator.
[Vol. 52:661
REASONABLE DOUBT IN DOUBT
precise parameters of such "relevant conduct" in the context of concur-
rent or past acquitted conduct. In particular, section lB1.3 does not
speak to the issue of whether acquitted conduct, relevant or not, is "con-
duct" in the first place. When the issue of acquitted conduct did arise
before Congress in 1992, in the form of a proposed amendment to sec-
tion lB 1.3, the amendment was rejected. The proposed amendment read
as follows: "Proposed Amendment: Section 1B1.3 is amended by
inserting the following additional subsection: '(c) Conduct of which the
defendant has been acquitted after trial shall not be considered under this
section.' "25
Ultimately, because the language of section lB1.3 may be inter-
preted broadly enough to embrace acquitted conduct,26 and because
attempts to limit that language have been unsuccessful, the text and con-
text of the current Guidelines have caused all but the Ninth Circuit to
anticipate the Supreme Court's decision in Watts. It remained common
practice for both pre-Guidelines27 as well as post-Guidelines judges to
use acquitted conduct as a factor in sentencing. 28 Nevertheless, it was
not until the Court's disposition of Watts that the use of acquitted con-
duct at sentencing became a judicially endorsed feature of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines themselves.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE GUIDELINES IN
WATTS AND PUTA
Watts arose when the government filed a single petition for certio-
rari seeking review of two Ninth Circuit cases, United States v. Watts
and United States v. Putra.z9 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that
sentencing courts could not consider underlying charges of which
defendants had been acquitted for sentencing purposes.3 0 Every other
circuit had held that a sentencing court may do so if the government
established the acquitted conduct by a lowered preponderance of the evi-
25. Proposed Amendment to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § IBI.3, 57 Fed. Reg.
62832 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992):
The Commentary to § IB 1.3 captioned "Application Notes" is amended by inserting
the following additional note: "11. Subsection (c) provides that conduct of which
the defendant has been acquitted after trial shall not be considered in determining
the offense level under this section. In an exceptional case, however, such conduct
may provide a basis for an upward departure"
Id. Similar amendments in 1993 were also rejected. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 62848 (proposed Dec.
31, 1992); 58 Fed. Reg. 67522, 67541 (proposed Dec. 21, 1993).
26. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 162.
27. See id. at 163.
28. See id. "Sentence enhancement through acquitted conduct is an entrenched feature of the
Guidelines." Id. at 164.
29. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1997).
30. See id.
1998]
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dence standard.31
In Watts, police officers conducted a probation search of Vernon
Watts' house.32 They recovered crack cocaine, two loaded firearms, and
ammunition.33 Subsequently, the state charged Watts with possessing
cocaine base with intent to distribute34 and with using a firearm in con-
nection with a drug offense.35 The jury convicted Watts on the narcotics
charge, but acquitted him on the weapons charge. The district court sen-
tenced him to 262 months in prison and sixty months of supervised
release.36  This sentence resulted from a two-level enhancement of
Watts' base offense level under Sentencing Guidelines section
2D1.l(b)(1), because the district court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Watts possessed a firearm during his drug offense.37 On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Watts successfully argued that the jury's
acquittal of him on the weapons charge precluded this enhancement
under United States v. Brady.
38
Similarly, in Putra, the District Court of Hawaii charged Cheryl
Ann Putra with aiding and abetting the possession of one ounce of
cocaine with intent to distribute; aiding and abetting the possession of
five ounces of cocaine with intent to distribute; and conspiring know-
ingly and intentionally to distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine.3 9
After a jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting the possession with
intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine, and acquitted her on the two
other charges, the district court sentenced her to twenty-seven months in
prison. The sentence was based on a twenty-seven to thirty-three month
sentencing range.4' To reach this range, the district court departed
upward from the Guidelines sentencing range for Putra's convicted
crime (fifteen to twenty-one months), by aggregating the amount of
31. See id.
32. See United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1995). California probationers are
subject to warrantless searches of their property. See id.
33. See id. at 793.
34. See id. Possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute is a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 842(a)(1) (1994). See id.
35. See Watts, 67 F.3d at 793. Use of a firearm in relation to a drug offense is a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994). See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 797. The district court stated that "although the jury did not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that all of the elements [of the weapons offense] ... were proven ... the only
logical explanation for the gun is that they emboldened Mr. Watts in his ... drug dealings." Id. at
797-98.
38. United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant's
acquittal of first degree murder and assault with intent to commit murder, precluded the district
court from enhancing the defendant's sentence for conviction of voluntary manslaughter and
assault with a dangerous weapon).
39. See United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996).
40. See id. at 1387.
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cocaine involved in her two acquitted charges.41 The court justified its
departure from Putra's base offense level by determining Putra's "guilt"
in the acquitted charges by a preponderance of the evidence.42 As in
Watts, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded based on United States
v. Brady.43
Under Brady, a district court cannot reconsider facts which the jury
necessarily rejected by its acquittal on another count in order to sentence
a criminal defendant for a convicted offense." "Otherwise, any time a
judge disagreed with the jury's verdict, the judge could 'reconsider' crit-
ical elements of the offense to avoid the restrictions of the Guidelines
and push the sentence to the maximum-in effect punishing the defend-
ant for an offense for which he or she had been acquitted. 45
In contrast to all other circuits, the Ninth Circuit applied Brady as a
bright line rule prohibiting sentencing judges, "under any standard of
proof,' 46 from relying on facts on which the defendant was acquitted.47
Thus, in Watts, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument
that, because Watts' sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm
under section 2D1.L(b)(1) contained fewer elements than the acquitted
statutory weapons offense under section 924(c), the district court's
determination that Watts possessed a firearm was not a reconsideration
of facts rejected by the jury.48 Instead, the court held that: "the only
difference between Section 2D1.1 (b)(1) and Section 924(c) is the assign-
ment and standard of the burden of proof ... Similarly, in Putra,
the Ninth Circuit held that the jury's acquittal of Putra for aiding and
abetting the possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine
was an explicit finding that Putra "was not involved, did not commit, did
not aid or abet, and was not engaged in" possession of that cocaine.5
IV. TiE SUPREME COURT MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
GUIDELINES
In reversing the Ninth Circuit in Watts, the Supreme Court relied
on 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and its "long-standing principle" of giving sentenc-
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1389.
44. See United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 851-52.
46. Id. at 851.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
defendant's acquittal on an armed robbery charge precluded the district court from enhancing the
defendant's sentence for conviction of conspiring to commit robbery).
48. See Watts, 67 F.3d at 797.
49. Id.
50. Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389.
1998]
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ing courts "broad discretion to consider various kinds of information."5'
This section states: "No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person con-
victed of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 52 In
light of cases involving use of uncharged conduct in sentencing, the
Supreme Court majority interpreted section 3661 to stand for the general
proposition that sentencing judges "may take into account facts intro-
duced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the defendant
has been acquitted. 53 In particular, the majority relied on Williams v.
New York, a 1949 pre-Guidelines case decided by the Supreme Court.
5 4
In Williams, the Court held that in sentencing a murder defendant to
death, the sentencing judge could legitimately rely on information that
the defendant had been involved in thirty burglaries, even though he had
not been convicted for any of them.
55
According to the Court, the Guidelines, promulgated in 1984 and
effective in 1987, did not alter the sentencing court's broad discretion to
use acquitted conduct in sentencing. 6 The Court turned to sections
1B1.4 and 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines to support its view. Sec-
tion lB1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines states: "In determining the sen-
tence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from
the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation,
any information concerning the background, character and conduct of
the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. '57 The commentary
to section lB1.3 states: "Conduct that is not formally charged or is not
formally an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range. 58 Section
1B1.3, which applies to sentencing based on multiple counts, instructs
the sentencing court to consider "all acts and omissions .. .that were
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction" even though the defendant is not convicted for
multiple counts 9.5  Thus, in accordance with Federal Sentencing Guide-
51. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994).
53. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635 (quoting United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (Scalia, J.)). See also Kirchner, supra note 14, at 804-05 (delineating the effects of
uncharged, unconvicted, and acquitted conduct on the "relevant conduct" clause and on outright
departure from the guideline range).
54. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
55. See id. at 244, 252.
56. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637.
57. SENTENCING GUiDELINES, supra note 8, at § 1BI.4.
58. Id. § 1B1.3 commentary, at 23.
59. Id. § 1BI.3 commentary, at 16. See also id. § 1B1.3 commentary, at 21 (stating that
[Vol. 52:661
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lines commentary, the Supreme Court's approach in Watts directs courts
sentencing drug offenders to consider the total quantity of drugs
involved in a series of drug sales, even though the defendant is only
convicted on one of the sales.60 This was the approach adopted by the
dissent in the Ninth Circuit's disposition of Putra.61 The Ninth Circuit,
however, distinguished acquitted conduct from uncharged conduct and
held that the jury's acquittal constituted a finding that Putra "was not
involved, did not commit, did not aid or abet, and was not engaged in"
the charged and acquitted drug transaction.62 In contrast, the Supreme
Court Watts majority viewed the "sweeping" language of section 1B1.3
as applying the same way to acquitted conduct as to uncharged con-
duct.63 Hence, the Supreme Court interpreted the plain language of the
Sentencing Commission Guidelines as directing sentencing courts to
consider all related conduct whether or not it resulted in a conviction.
The Watts majority found further support in its double jeopardy
jurisprudence.6' In Witte v. United States, the Court held that the double
jeopardy clause did not preclude subsequent prosecution for an
uncharged drug offense that the sentencing court had used to enhance a
prior convicted drug offense under the Guidelines.65 In interpreting that
case, the Watts majority explained that sentencing enhancements "do not
punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather
increase his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the
crime of conviction. 66 Thus, according to the majority, using acquitted
conduct in sentencing does not constitute imposing punishment for the
acquitted conduct. Rather, the acquitted conduct becomes part of the
manner in which the convicted crime was committed.
Extending this principle, the Court turned to Dowling v. United
States and McMillan v. Pennsylvania for the proposition that "an acquit-
"[aipplication of this provision does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of
multiple counts.").
60. See id. § IB 1.3 commentary, at 21 (stating as example, that "where the defendant engaged
in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan, subsection (a)(2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45
grams) is to be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a single
count charging only one of the sales.").
61. See Putra, 78 F.3d at 1389-90 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1387-89.
63. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635-36.
64. "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U. S. CoNsT. amend. V. cl. 2; see also United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 337
(1979) ("Allowing a second jury to reconsider the very issue upon which the defendant has
prevailed... implicates concerns about the injustice of exposing a defendant to repeated risks of
conviction for the same conduct, and to the ordeal of multiple trials, that lie at the heart of the
double jeopardy clause.").
65. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995).
66. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636.
19981
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tal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating
an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower
standard of proof."' 67 In McMillan, the Court held that sentencing courts
could use a preponderance of the evidence standard where there was no
allegation that the sentencing enhancement was "a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense. ' 68 The Watts majority found support for
this in the commentary to section 6A1.3 of the Guidelines which states:
"The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy con-
cerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the
facts of a case."69
Accordingly, the Watts majority upheld the idea that an acquittal
does not constitute a finding or rejection of any fact.7° According to the
Court, acquittal on a criminal charge simply means that the prosecution
was unable to prove its case to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.7' It
does not prove that a defendant is innocent.72 In this sense, the Watts
Court rejected the idea of factual innocence, and imported into the judi-
cial arena a legal conception of innocence based on alternate burdens of
proof.
73
67. Id. at 637 (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990)).
68. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986), cited in Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637-38.
69. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at § 6A1.3 commentary, at 319.
70. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637 (quoting Chief Justice Wallace's dissenting opinion in United
States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996)).
71. As one commentator put it: "[W]ith all the opportunities to explore the accused's
innocence, the defense need only disprove guilt." William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence,
70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 377 (1995).
72. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1456, 1462 n.21 (1996). Colb states, "Although all criminal
defendants benefit procedurally from an evidentiary presumption of innocence, that presumption
does not mean that such defendants are actually 'innocent' until convicted. The presumption
ensures that the government meets a high standard of proof, but it does not define the actual
culpability of the defendant." Id.
73. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 636-37. Whereas factual innocence connotes actual non-
culpability, legal innocence refers to a status recognized in law. In short, although a criminal
defendant may in fact have committed the crime of which he is accused, the law recognizes him as
innocent until the state is able to constitutionally prove its case against him. Thus, if the state is
prevented from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by the Fourth Amendment's bar against
the use of illegally gathered evidence, a factually culpable thief may be deemed legally innocent
after trial. See also Laufer, supra note 71, at 352 ("an accused is legally innocent, and therefore
not criminally culpable, where procedural rules are not strictly observed or where viable defenses
and excuses are relevant"); LeRoy Pemell, The Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining
Significance of the Presumption of Innocence-A Brief Commentary, 37 CLav. ST. L. REv. 393,
398-99 (1989) (distinguishing legal and factual guilt).
REASONABLE DOUBT IN DOUBT
V. THE SUPREME COURT CONCURRENCES AND DISSENTS
A. The Supreme Court Concurrences
Justice Breyer concurred in the Court's decision because he did not
consider that the Guidelines in their current written form make an excep-
tion for acquitted conduct as "relevant conduct."74 He argued, however,
that the power to rewrite the Guidelines in order to exclude the use of
acquitted conduct, remains with the Commission,75 and suggested that
the Commission could do so in the future in light of pertinent policy
considerations and the central role of juries and acquittals to our judicial
system.76
Justice Scalia concurred separately because he disagreed with Jus-
tice Breyer's assertion that the Commission has the authority to reverse
the Court's decision.77 Justice Scalia posited that the plain language of
28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3661, as written by Congress,
mandates the Commission and the courts to approve sentence enhance-
ments and departures from the Guidelines. 78 Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)
requires the Commission to promulgate Guidelines "consistent with all
pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code."' 79 Title 18, in turn,
requires that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concern-
ing the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for
the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."80 Ultimately, Justice
Scalia suggested that the Commission and the courts lack the power to
impose a preponderance of the evidence standard with respect to acquit-
ted conduct at sentencing: "neither the Commission, nor the courts have
authority to decree that information which would otherwise justify
enhancement . . . or . . . departure from the Guidelines, may not be
considered for that purpose (or may be considered only after passing
some higher standard of probative worth than the Constitution and laws
require) if it pertains to acquitted conduct."8 Thus, although the Com-
mission may make recommendations to Congress, according to Justice
Scalia, Congress alone is empowered to make changes restricting the use
of "relevant conduct," including acquitted conduct, at sentencing.82
74. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75. See id. See also Johnson, supra note 21, at 187 (arguing that the Commission clearly has
the authority to rewrite the Guidelines to exclude acquitted conduct).
76. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 639.
77. See id. at 638 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. See id.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) (1994).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994) (emphasis added).
81. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638 (emphasis added).
82. See id.
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B. The Supreme Court Dissents
Justice Stevens' dissent rejected the majority's broad view of the
Sentencing Guidelines, and endorsed a contextual look at the pertinent
statutory provisions. Acknowledging that the Sentencing Guidelines did
not supersede 18 U.S.C. § 3661, enacted in 1970, Justice Stevens com-
menced his analysis by reviewing the policies and historical exigencies
which gave rise to the Guidelines in the first place.83 According to Jus-
tice Stevens, the Guidelines comprised much more than suggested by
their "modest name"; their advent was a revolution in sentencing, with
"the force and effect of laws."84 In contrast to the pre-Guideline ideals
of fairness and rehabilitation cited in Williams,5 the Guidelines aimed
to reduce judicial discretion by implementing "strict mandatory rules...
dramatically confin[ing] the exercise of judgment based on a totality of
the circumstances. 86
Justice Stevens explained that section 3661 "does support [the
Supreme Court majority's] narrow holding that sentencing courts may
sometimes consider conduct of the defendants underlying other charges
of which they had been acquitted. ' 87 However, in the same way that
section 3661 is not impinged upon by Guideline provisions that bar sen-
tencing judges from considering evidence of economic hardship, drug or
alcohol dependence, or lack of youthful guidance, section 3661 is not
necessarily impinged upon by barring sentencing courts' use of acquit-
ted conduct.88 Rather, section 3661 makes clear to judges that otherwise
inadmissible evidence at trial can be considered for purposes of sentenc-
ing, but does not instruct judges how to weigh the significance of such
"relevant conduct. 89 Ultimately, to the extent that it is constrained by
the Sentencing Guidelines, section 3661 does not authorize sentencing
judges to consider any and all inadmissible evidence at sentencing.
Justice Stevens further distinguished the interaction of section 3661
and the Guidelines for purposes of setting a sentencing range, from the
interaction of section 3661 and the Guidelines for purposes of sentenc-
ing within that range. According to Justice Stevens, section 3661 grants
sentencing judges broad discretion to enhance or minimize sentences
83. See id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Stevens compares Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) ("Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence"), with 28
U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994) (rejecting rehabilitation as a sentencing goal) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
(1994) (stating that "punishment should serve retributive, deterrent, educational and incapacitative
goals"). Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 639 n.l.
86. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 639.
87. Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 639.
89. See id. at 640.
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within a particular Guideline range.9" However, the mandatory rules of
the Sentencing Guidelines strictly cabin judges' ability to set that Guide-
line range in the first place.9" In sum, "the Guidelines incorporate the
broadly inclusive language of Section 3661 only into those portions of
the sentencing decision in which the judge retains discretion."92 This
interpretation accords with the Guidelines' purpose of producing uni-
formity in sentencing.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens described section 3661 as being only
incorporated into section lB1.4. Section lB 1.4 addresses application of
relevant conduct within a guideline range: "Information to be Used in
Imposing Sentence (Selecting a Point Within the Guideline Range or
Departing from the Guidelines). 93 Section 1B1.3, on the other hand,
directs the determination of which guideline range to apply in the first
place: "This section [lB1.4] distinguishes between factors that deter-
mine the applicable guideline sentencing range (S B1.3) and informa-
tion that a court may consider in imposing sentence within that range. 94
Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority's interpretation of sec-
tion lB1.3 was flawed, both in that the majority ignored the explicit
incorporation of section 3661 only into section lB1.4, and in that the
majority cited background commentary to section lB1.3 out of context.
The Watts majority cited background commentary to section 1B1.3 as
follows: "Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of
the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the appli-
cable guideline sentencing range."95 However, the majority omitted the
surrounding interpretation which gives section 1B1.3 real import:
This section prescribes rules for determining the applicable sentenc-
ing range, whereas [Section] 1B1.4 (Information to be Used in
Imposing Sentence) governs the range of information that the court
90. See id. at 640; see also SENTENCING GumELIEs, supra note 8, at § IB 1.4 commentary, at
25:
A court is not precluded from considering information that the guidelines do not
take into account. For example, if the defendant committed two robberies, but as
part of a plea negotiation entered a guilty plea to only one, the robbery that was not
taken into account by the guidelines would provide a reason for sentencing at the
top of the guideline range. In addition, information the determination of the
applicable guideline sentence range may be considered in determining whether and
to what extent to depart from the guidelines.
91. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 640. Of course, sentencing judges retain the power to depart from
the Guideline ranges where there are mitigating or aggravating factors: "[T]he court shall impose
a sentence ... within the range . . . unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
92. Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 640.
93. SENTENCING GuIoELINEs, supra note 8, at § 1B1.4.
94. Id. at 25.
95. Id. § lB 1.3 commentary, at 23.
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may consider in adjudging sentence once the guideline sentencing
range has been determined. Conduct that is not formally charged or is
not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the deter-
mination of the applicable guideline sentencing range. The range of
information that may be considered at sentencing is broader than the
range of information upon which the applicable sentencing range is
determined.
96
Justice Stevens emphasized the absurd implications of the Supreme
Court majority's interpretation. This interpretation enabled the district
court in Putra to use Putra's prior acquittal to impose the same sentenc-
ing range as it would have had to impose if Putra had been convicted.97
In effect, Putra's acquittal caused her sentence to be six months longer
than the maximum allowed for the only crime she was convicted of
beyond a reasonable doubt.98
Moreover, Justice Stevens critiqued the majority's misplaced use of
precedent to justify its outcome.9 9 In particular, Justice Stevens distin-
guished Williams v. New York, because Williams dealt with the exercise
of discretion within an authorized sentencing range, and not with the
limitations in setting that range in the first place. 100 In addition, because
the accuracy of the judge's determination at sentencing was never chal-
lenged by the appellant, the burden of proof applicable at sentencing was
not even an issue in Williams. 01 Above all, Williams represented pre-
Guidelines ideals of rehabilitation and reform in sentencing. °2 Thus,
the Supreme Court Watts majority misapplied Williams in the context of
post-Guideline rejection of unfettered judicial discretion serving those
ideals. 0 3 Interestingly, the jury in Williams recommended that the
defendant be spared the death penalty; yet the judge overrode the jury's
recommendation, and imposed the death sentence. 1°4 Despite reliance
on such an extreme case, the Watts majority skirted the issue of the
admissibility of "relevant" acquitted conduct that would dramatically
increase a defendant's sentence.1
0 5
In support of its reliance on Williams, the Watts majority cited
Nichols v. United States, United States v. Donelson, and BMW of North
96. Id.
97. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 640-41.
98. See id. at 641.
99. See id. at 641-42.
100. See id. at 641.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 641-42.
103. See id. at 642.
104. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242 (1949).
105. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 637-38.
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America, Inc. v. Gore.' 6 However, the majority did not explain how
these cases supported an extension of the Williams holding to acquitted
conduct as well as to uncharged conduct." °7 In fact, Nichols was a DUI
case involving use of a past misdemeanor conviction (not acquittal) in
sentencing, 0 8 and Donelson was an equal protection claim involving the
sentencing of youthful offenders."° BMW was a civil damages case
having no connection to sentencing or the issue of acquitted conduct
under the Guidelines." 0 A review of these cases simply illustrates that
Williams is still cited (in these cases as dicta) for the proposition that a
sentencing judge may consider "past criminal behavior which did not
result in a [criminal] conviction."' 11
Furthermore, Justice Stevens distinguished McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, because McMillan merely stated that the Constitution does not
require sentencing factors to be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
where those sentencing factors operate solely to increase the minimum
sentence without altering the maximum. 112 As the Court made clear in
McMillan, its decision did not alter the maximum penalty for the crime
committed, but limited sentencing discretion "in selecting a penalty
within the range already available.""' 3 Thus, McMillan does not apply,
factually or legally, to the situation in Watts or Putra, where the defend-
ants' sentences were increased beyond the Guideline maximums for the
convicted offenses. Moreover, the McMillan Court conceded its inabil-
ity to lay down any bright line rule by reasoning that it was interpreting
a clearly written state statute in which the issued sentencing factor did
not present itself as a "tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense.""' 4 As Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out, the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 does not present the same congressional clarity as
the state statute construed in McMillan."5
In the same way that he disagreed with the holding in McMillan,
106. See id. at 635 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); United States v.
Donelson, 695 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1982); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996)).
107. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 635.
108. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740.
109. See Donelson, 695 F.2d at 584.
110. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
111. Id. at 1597 n.19 (citing Williams, 337 U.S. 241 as dicta); see also Nichols, 511 U.S. at
747.
112. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
114. Id.
115. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 642; see also Susan N. Herman, Tail That Wagged the Dog:
Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 323 (1992).
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Justice Stevens disagreed with the holding in Witte v. United States.11 6
However, he distinguished the issue of whether the double jeopardy
clause permits conviction for conduct that has contributed to a determi-
nation of a defendant's base offense level in a previous conviction, from
the issue of using acquitted conduct at sentencing. 1 7 The Supreme
Court Watts majority did not make this distinction between uncharged
and acquitted conduct. Nor did the majority address the fact that Witte
dealt with sentence enhancement within a sentencing range, rather than
departure from a range as in Watts. Ultimately, in citing Witte for the
proposition that: "[V]ery roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corre-
sponds to those actions and circumstances that courts typically took into
account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines' enactment,"' 8 the
Watts majority did not address the implication that "relevant conduct"
under the Guidelines may include less than all of the actions and circum-
stances that judges typically took into account prior to the Guidelines." 9
As a final point in his dissent, Justice Stevens considered the inter-
action between "multiple offenses" and the Sentencing Guidelines.
20
Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(1) explicitly directs the imposition of incremental
punishment for "multiple offenses" of which a defendant "is con-
victed."'' The effect of the majority's interpretation of section 994(1) in
Putra was to impose an incremental penalty for each offense of which
Putra was charged simply because she was convicted of at least one of
these offenses. Justice Stevens rejected this result. He reasoned that the
statute's language does not, as the majority interpreted it, authorize
incremental punishment for multiple offenses of which the defendant is
not convicted, let alone acquitted. 122 Thus, Justice Stevens condemned
the Watts majority's interpretation of the statute as an unwarranted abro-
gation of the reasonable doubt rule which has always applied to charges
involving either multiple or single offenses.
123
Ultimately, Justice Stevens' dissent demonstrated that the historical
and structural implications of the Sentencing Guidelines belie the major-
ity's overall result, because the Guidelines were promulgated to reduce
116. 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
117. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 635 (citing Wine, 515 U.S. at 402 (citing United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441
(1st Cir. 1989))).
119. If this were not the case, the Guidelines would have little impact in reducing judicial
discretion.
120. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 994(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
122. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. See id. But see the majority's rejoinder arguing that the statute "is not cast in restrictive
terms." Id. at 636 (quoting United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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judicial discretion and disparate sentences.124 Certainly, allowing judges
to pick sentencing ranges indiscriminately contradicts the very purpose
of eliminating bias and irregularity in sentencing. This purpose is effec-
tuated by limiting discretion to sentencing within fixed uniform parame-
ters. Consequently, as the dissent argued, the plain language and
historical context of the Sentencing Guidelines contradict the Court's
holding in Watts. Furthermore, by validating the use of the preponder-
ance of evidence standard at sentencing, the Court's holding, in effect,
sanctioned criminal sentencing upon relitigation at a lower standard of
proof. This calls into question a central aspect of our judicial system:
that the only constitutional relitigation of criminal issues at a lower stan-
dard of proof occurs in the civil arena.125 This principle rests on the
proposition that the constitutional rights of the accused are much more
fundamental than the monetary liability at stake in civil actions.126
Justice Kennedy dissented separately from Justice Stevens,
because, although he did not necessarily disagree with the Watts major-
ity's rationale, he thought that the majority skirted the distinction
between uncharged and acquitted conduct.127 Justice Kennedy conceded
that the practicality of sentencing might diminish the distinction, but
acknowledged that such diminution implicates concerns about under-
mining acquittal verdicts. 2 ' Thus, Justice Kennedy recommended that
the case should have been set for full briefing and oral argument before
the Supreme Court as an issue of first impression.
1 29
VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DuE
PROCESS
The Court's contention, that acquittal does not mean that a defend-
ant is innocent, is both circular and at odds with historical notions of
criminal justice in the American judicial process. In the most basic
meaning of the term, criminal "acquittal" is "the legal and formal certifi-
cation of the innocence of a person who has been charged with a crime;
124. See Forde, supra note 14, at 402-04 (arguing that Williams is a relic of the pre-Guideline
system).
125. "Because different standards of proof are involved, acquittal in the criminal action does
not bar a civil suit based on the same facts." See 2 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 468 (2d ed. 1982).
126. See Miguel M. Delao, Admissibility of Prior Acquitted Crimes Under Rule 404(b): Why
the Majority Should Adopt the Minority Rule, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1033, 1051 n.148 (1989)
(citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1979)).
127. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 644 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. See id. See also Johnson, supra note 21, at 194 ("The bottom line is that acquittal carries
a message about the defendant's legal innocence that mere absence of a conviction does not.").
129. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 644.
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a deliverance or setting free a person from a charge of guilt."1 30 The
effect of acquittal, whether resulting from a jury or judicial verdict, is to
terminate prosecution.' Similarly, charges that have been dismissed
are no longer at issue, and "testimony about them would have been irrel-
evant."1 32 The finality of acquittals is further embedded in our double
jeopardy jurisprudence, whose maxim is that a verdict of acquittal is
"final, and [cannot] be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting
[the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the
Constitution."
' 133
The finality of judgments is also a concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.1 34  Despite the
majority's claim that sentencing based on acquitted conduct is not pun-
ishment for acquitted charges, the use of acquitted conduct in sentenc-
ing, under a graduated preponderance of the evidence standard,
constitutes punishment because the defendant is, in effect, "semi-
guilty. '1 35 Such punishment harkens back to a substantive 136 or medie-
val 13 7 system whose premise was that the suspect always deserved pun-
ishment: after all, one cannot be "the object of suspicion and be
completely innocent."
1 38
Yet, our current criminal system is premised on a rejection of such
relativism. 139  Our criminal system presupposes a commitment to a
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 25 (6th ed. 1990). "[O]ur judicial system treats an acquittal as
a verdict of innocence." Delao, supra note 126, at 1050. It "is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence
that ... in the eyes of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent." Id. at 1048.
131. See WRIGHT, supra note 125, at § 468.
132. State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 653, 666 (Minn. App. 1985) (quoting WRIGHT, supra note
125, at § 468).
133. Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When Is an Acquittal
Not an Acquittal?, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953, 954 (1995).
134. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
135. Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 498 (1989) (justifying the role of reasonable doubt in the criminal arena).
136. See id. at 498.
137. In medieval times, a criminal defendant was effectively presumed guilty, and had to
overcome that presumption by submitting to arbitrary and cruel practices such as trial by ordeal
(i.e., battling to the death, or carrying red hot irons) or by producing twelve peers to swear under
oath to his innocence, in order to actually prove "divine" innocence. See CARLETON K. ALLEN,
LEGAL DUTIEs AND OTHER ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 255, 259-73 (1931). See also Laufer, supra
note 71, at 330-32 and accompanying notes for an excellent exploration of the presumption of
innocence and the evolution of our current adversarial system from an inquisitorial system.
138. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT 42 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978).
139. "No principle is more firmly established in our system of criminal justice than the
presumption of innocence." Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Sundby, supra note 135, at 457 ('The presumption [of innocence] has been
called the 'golden thread' that runs throughout the criminal law, heralded as the 'cornerstone of
Anglo-Saxon justice,' and identified as the 'focal point of any concept of due process."').
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bright line dualism that ensures that one either is or is not guilty or
innocent. Thus, although factually "less than innocent," a criminal
defendant is considered legally innocent if the government does not
prove its case against him beyond a reasonable doubt.14 ° In this sense,
innocence is the effect of acquittal, as well as the cause. 4'
Moreover, because the process of adjudicating guilt continues
beyond trial with no clearly demarcated end point through the appeals
process, it is arguable whether the presumption of innocence disappears
with respect to conduct for which a defendant has been tried and con-
victed.142 However, the axiom behind the presumption of innocence is
that the defendant is innocent with respect to conduct for which he has
not been tried, or for which he has been acquitted. Logically, then,
acquitted conduct should fall within the purview of the presumption,
whether at sentencing, or for purposes of double jeopardy, the Eighth
Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment, or the due pro-
cess protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 4 '
Ultimately, despite the Watts Court's failure to distinguish them,
and despite their patent similarities,' uncharged and acquitted conduct
implicate different issues for purposes of sentencing. 4 5 On one level,
although uncharged conduct is still presumed "innocent," the "inno-
cence" of acquitted conduct is a judicially stamped fact. Moreover,
acquitted conduct may refer either to conduct adjudicated and acquitted
in a past trial, or to conduct adjudicated and acquitted in the same trial as
the crime of conviction.'46 Watts and Putra involved only such contem-
140. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (placing a high burden of persuasion
on the government by holding that the due process clause requires the government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged against a criminal
defendant.)
141. Cf. Sundby, supra note 135, at 488 ("To speak of innocence as part of the presumption of
innocence is to refer to an outcome, a result, with which the criminal justice system is
concerned.").
142. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 360 n.136 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399
(1993)). The "purpose of the trial stage from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal
defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
143. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 181-83.
144. For example, the following statement could apply equally to either uncharged or acquitted
conduct:
It is fundamentally unfair and totally incongruous with our basic concepts of justice
to permit the sovereign to offer proof that a defendant committed a specific crime
which a jury of that sovereign has concluded he did not commit. Otherwise a
person could never remove himself from the blight and suspicious aura which
surround an accusation that he is guilty of a specific crime.
Delao, supra note 126, at 1045.
145. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 157-58 (arguing that use of acquitted conduct in sentencing
raises distinct policy considerations from the use of unadjudicated conduct).
146. See id. at 158.
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poraneous acquitted conduct. Theoretically, then, the Supreme Court
majority's holding in Watts is limited to contemporaneous acquitted
conduct. This makes sense in that, where acquittal is not contemporane-
ous, judges can only determine preponderance of the evidence reliability
by examining the record of a trial at which they were not present. In
sum, use of past acquitted conduct gives rise to more serious concerns
about the right to a fair trial. However, in light of current practice in all
but the Ninth Circuit, it is not likely that sentencing courts applying the
Court's holding in Watts will pause to distinguish between past and con-
temporaneous conduct.
The Watts Court's failure to distinguish between uncharged and
acquitted conduct is symptomatic of a pervasive dichotomy between the
semantics of innocence147 and the reality of our criminal justice sys-
tem.14 8 The semantics of innocence describes a surface commitment to
the presumption of innocence. This surface commitment is embodied in
such legal truisms as: "[I]n the eye of the law every man is honest and
innocent, unless it be proved legally to the contrary";14 9 and "the defend-
ant is as innocent on the day before his trial as he is on the morning after
his acquittal."'' 51 In reality, our criminal system poses a far less grandi-
ose scenario:
The whole course of criminal procedure, from inception to close, is
designed to shut out presumptions of innocence and invite presump-
tions of guilt. The secrecy of complaintmaking.. ., the mysterious
inquisition of the grand jury room, the publicity of the arrest, the
commitment to the lock-up, the demand of bail, the delay of trial, the
enforced silence.1
51
In the final analysis, the presumption of innocence emerges as a compro-
mise between a presumption of guilt and a commitment to due process:
"it is better that ten guilty persons escape . . . than that one innocent
suffer." 152 In effect, the presumption becomes a calculator for the mar-
gin of error which society is prepared to accept in discarding the
assumption of true factual innocence. 153
147. See Delao, supra note 126, at 1046.
148. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE XXi-ii (1982). Dershowitz defines the
unwritten rules that dictate the reality of our criminal system on a day to day basis. Axiomatic to
these rules is the pervasive understanding by everyone in the criminal system, including the
defendant himself, that the defendant is guilty. See id.
149. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
551-552 (1898) (citation omitted).
150. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 764 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. Pernell, supra note 73, at 414 n. 117 (citing ANONYMOUS, TEN YEARS A POLICE JUDGE 207
(1884)).
152. Id. at 393 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE CoMMrNARIES 358 (1969)).
153. See Sundby, supra note 135, at 459-61. See also Barton L. Ingraham, The Right of
Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the Burden of Proof and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to
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One of the reasons for the disparity between the rhetoric and the
reality of innocence, is that the symbolic and pragmatic implications of
the presumption of innocence fluctuate in the face of different justifica-
tions for punishment. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) lists a series of fac-
tors to be considered in imposing a sentence. These include:
(2) The need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner;
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.' 54
These factors correspond with both utilitarian and retributionary justifi-
cations for imprisonment: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. However, to the extent that utilitareanism is concerned
with the maintenance of law and order through deterrence and its inca-
pacitation, 155 its efficacy depends on the system's increased capacity to
catch offenders. Moreover, it depends on how those offenders view that
capacity; in other words, whether offenders think they will get caught.
Assuming, for deterrence purposes, that criminals are rational actors
who weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, it is unlikely that
criminals who have been through the criminal justice system already,
will be any more deterred from breaking the law by the abstract possibil-
ity that if they do get caught, they risk a stiffer sentence because of a
past acquittal.1 56 Similarly, incapacitation is most effective if individu-
als who commit the most crimes are put away longer than individuals
who commit fewer crimes, because this would reduce the overall
amount of crime. Using acquitted conduct to sentence defendants to
longer prison terms does not serve this purpose because "individuals
committing the most crimes" implicates "individuals convicted of the
most crimes"-not individuals accused of the most crimes.
157
O'Reilly, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559, 595 n.43 ("the Blackstone ratio works out to a
calculation that the subjective level of probability of guilt in the juror's mind must exceed 91%
certainty.").
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
155. See id. Subsections (A) and (B) of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) refer to the maintenance of law
and order through respect for the law and deterrence; (C) refers to incapacitation. See id.
156. But see Johnson, supra note 21, at 199 (arguing that the rational defendant is unlikely to
opt for trial over plea-bargaining on the remote possibility of a partial acquittal and subsequent
sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct).
157. See also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 455 (1894) ("If it suffices to accuse, what
will become of the innocent?").
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Furthermore, to the extent that retribution, namely rehabilitation
and punishment, are still factors in sentencing, 158 the question once
again becomes that of due process: in the same way that we decline to
punish innocent people in order to deter others, 159 shouldn't we decline
to punish based solely on a moralistic hunch that the defendant is "gen-
erally guilty"? In other words, do we punish a person for Crime A, of
which he is innocent, simply because he is guilty of Crime B and
deserves all the punishment we can give him? Moreover, for purposes of
rehabilitation, what, other than disrespect and distrust of our criminal
justice system, do we teach a criminal defendant when we use acquitted
conduct, of which he is factually innocent, against him at sentencing?1 60
In the final analysis, many jurists lament the fact that "from a con-
stitutional standpoint, the presumption of innocence has been relegated
to an evidentiary rule barely distinguishable from the prosecution's bur-
den of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 161 On the other hand,
some suggest that innocence is not a constitutionally defined value in
itself, even though the procedures protecting innocence are constitution-
ally guaranteed. 6 Ultimately, it is interesting to speculate whether the
presumption of innocence is simply a collage of the reasonable doubt
rule and our judicial system's ostensible liberty safeguards, or whether
"innocence" itself has some intrinsic value. One might also ask whether
the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt rule are constitu-
tionally guaranteed or merely complementary.1 63
Nevertheless, it is axiomatic, in theory at least, that our criminal
justice system allocates the burden of production and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to the state, to protect the individual's liberty interest
from the state's unwarranted trampling for criminal convictions." 6 This
burden allocation reflects the democratic consensus that, without sub-
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)(2) (1994). Subsection (A) refers to providing just punishment;
Subsection (D) refers to rehabilitation. See id. However, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) directs the
Commission to insure that the Guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imprisonment for
purposes of rehabilitation. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994).
159. This would be pure utilitarianism at its unconstitutional extreme.
160. In the same way that it is "impossible for the government to confine [Fourth Amendment]
searches to the guilty and thereby protect only the innocent," Colb, supra note 72, at 1480, we
must ask ourselves to what extent we are prepared to sacrifice the "truly" innocent in order to
punish the "guilty."
161. Pernell, supra note 73, at 414; see also Laufer, supra note 71, at 347, 388, 403, 343-51;
Sundby, supra note 135, at 510 n.17 (historical analysis of the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable doubt rule). All three authors argue that the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable doubt rule are distinct, even though they are often indistinguishable in the actual
practice of law.
162. See Sundby, supra note 135, at 487.
163. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 388 ("Innocence, as a burden-allocating presumption, serves
what some consider to be a complementary role with the reasonable doubt rule.").
164. See generally Laufer, supra note 71, at 332-34 (concluding that the reasonable doubt rule
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stance, the due process rights encompassed within the Constitution "is a
hollow symbol of our collective commitment to an impartial accusatory
system." '165 In this narrow sense, the reasonable doubt rule gives vitality
to the presumption of innocence1 66 and the criminal defendant's right to
a fair trial. 1 67 Ultimately, even if the Watts Court's interpretation of the
Guidelines was correct based on a literal reading of the current Guide-
lines, its decision erodes fundamental due process guarantees encom-
passed symbolically and pragmatically in the presumption of innocence.
In essence, the Court sought to impose a form of strict liability for crimi-
nal behavior, whereby guilt attaches generally to the person and not only
to the specific act for which he was found "guilty.' 68
VII. THE PRAGMATIC IMPLICATION OF HANDING OVER FACT-FINDING
DISCRETION TO PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES UNDER THE
GUISE OF "SENTENCING"
Despite the Supreme Court Watts majority's careful defense that
using acquitted conduct in sentencing does not constitute punishment for
those acquitted charges, the import of the majority's decision is that
criminal defendants can effectively be punished for acquitted conduct if
they are convicted of other conduct.1 69 In sum, the Court's Watts deci-
sion moves the criminal justice system away from adjudication of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt based on review of admissible evidence at
trial, to adjudication of guilt by a preponderance of the evidence based
on review of a trial record. 7 ° In this sense, it moves the judicial system
gives the presumption of innocence constitutional meaning); Sundby, supra note 135, at 458
(same).
165. Laufer, supra note 71, at 374.
166. See Sundby, supra note 135, at 458. 'The presumption of innocence guards against extra-
legal suspicion and unwarranted inference," subsumed by the Sixth Amendment's right to an
impartial jury, and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses.
Laufer, supra note 71, at 404.
167. "The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
503 (1976). Other manifestations of the presumption of innocence include: the privilege against
self-incrimination, the state's duty to disclose exculpatory or compulsory evidence, the right to
confront adverse witnesses, the right to effective counsel, and the right to remain silent while in
police custody and during trial. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 334.
168. Strict liability statutes reflect a policy decision that the state's interest in deterrence
outweighs any unfairness in negating the element of intent. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 254 (1922).
169. See Delao, supra note 126, at 1050 (admission of prior acquitted conduct results in
retrying the defendant for the earlier crime, regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is
admitted).
170. See Poulin, supra note 133, at 953 (citing a Supreme Court of Israel case in which the
prosecutor was able to seek appellate review to reverse a trial court's acquittal of four rape
defendants. The Supreme Court of Israel's reversal was based on a mere review of the trial
record).
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from bright line definitions of guilt and innocence to ad hoc graduated
definitions balancing the individual's right to liberty with society's right
to punish. In short, the Court's decision allows the government to
bypass an obstacle course of legal protections and safeguards in place
before, during, and after trial, 17' by allowing the government to travel a
less circuitous road of lowered burdens and open doors. This road aptly
characterizes the conveyor belt image associated with the effort towards
crime control.
172
The crime control model views the repression of criminal conduct
as the criminal process' main objective. As such, the crime control
model views the initial pre-trial stages of adjudication, including arrest,
arraignment, and plea-bargaining, to be indicators of guilt.173 On the
opposite end of the spectrum, the due process model rejects informal
fact-finding and insists on formal adjudicative, adversary processes. 174
Although the presumption of innocence, legal or factual, tends to be
implicit in the due process model, the presumption seems, inescapably,
to be rejected by the crime control model. 175 This is despite the fact
that, on average, only about three per cent of national felony arrests are
adjudicated at trial, and only about one per cent of felony arrests are
acquitted at trial. 176 Ultimately, it is with Orwellian irony that the Sen-
tencing Guidelines were created under the auspices of the Crime Control
Act of 1984.
It is often easy to envision cases which lend themselves to a crime
control interpretation of the Guidelines. For example, in United States v.
Otto, a defendant, who was convicted of possessing an unregistered fire-
arm, stalked and terrorized his former girlfriend and her children over an
eighteen-month period.'77 The court held that a six-level upward depar-
ture from the guidelines sentence was proper in light of the fact that the
defendant inflicted severe psychological injury, terror, sleeplessness,
weight loss, and other trauma on his victims, even though the behavior
was not taken into account in the guidelines sentence for possessing an
171. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 352.
172. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 159 (1968).
173. See id. at 158.
174. See id. at 163-64.
175. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 421 nn.94 & 97. "Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the innocent
man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the
watery sentiments that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v.
Garrson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
176. See Laufer, supra note 71, at 421 nn.208-11 (citing BARaBARA BOLAND ET AL., THE
PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS 1988 (1992)).
177. See United States v. Otto, 64 F.3d 367, 367 (8th Cir. 1995).
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unregistered firearm. 17 8 In United States v. Hill, a pre-Guidelines deci-
sion, a state supreme court held that information in a presentence report
of prior criminal activities by the defendant for which he had never been
arrested, indicted, or convicted, was highly relevant to sentencing
him.179 The Court's Watts decision endorses such outcomes in order to
get "results." In essence, the decision encourages judges and prosecu-
tors to bypass judicial processes and undermines sentencing as a "critical
stage" of criminal proceedings.1 80 It widens the open door for prosecu-
tors and judges to use evidence which is inadmissible at trial1 8' to retry
defendants without a jury on a preponderance of the evidence standard,
all under the guise of "sentencing."
Cases with frightening facts, like Otto, make it tempting to replace
absolutes of innocence with a balancing between the government's inter-
est in criminal punishment and the individual's Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest.18 2 However, it is axiomatic to our justice system that
"the safeguards of liberty are frequently forged in controversies involv-
ing not very nice people."'' 8 3 Rather than destroying the presumption of
innocence and its concomitant protections for us all,'84 our frustration
with the efficacy of the criminal justice system should lead us to
revamp, not the presumption of innocence, but the Sentencing Guide-
lines themselves. For example, the difficulty with not allowing sentenc-
178. See id. at 371.
179. See United States v. Hill, 688 F.2d 18, 20 (8th Cir. 1982).
180. See Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (finding sentencing to be a critical stage
of the criminal justice process requiring assistance of appointed counsel).
181. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at § 6A1.3(a) ("In resolving any reasonable
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at
trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy."). See also United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding hearsay
admissible at sentencing); United States v. Murillo, 902 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a district court acted within its discretion in relying solely on information contained in a
presentencing report when departing upward from the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v.
McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that evidence seized from an illegal
warrantless search was admissible at sentencing). Additionally, the Court is supported by the
Commission: "The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is
appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding
application of the guidelines to the facts of a case." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at
§ 6A1.3 commentary, at 319.
182. Cf. Pernell, supra note 73, at 393 (arguing that since the 1970's, courts have eroded the
presumption of innocence in the face of society's belief that it is made safer by massive
deprivations of liberty).
183. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463-64 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter J., dissenting)).
184. See Matthew S. Sullivan, Note, The Admissibility of Prior Acquittal Evidence-Has North
Carolina Adopted the "Minority View"?-The Effect of State v. Scott, 16 CAMPa.L L. REV. 231,
231 (1994) (Society has a stake both in "preserving the finality of judgments and in protecting
individuals against governmental overreaching.").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ing courts to use acquitted rape conduct is that rape, and sexual assault
in general, is so rarely and unsuccessfully prosecuted.18 5  However,
rather than seeking the admission of acquitted conduct at sentencing, we
should address head on the unwillingness of the system to prosecute so-
called "sex" crimes and the difficulty of obtaining convictions in the
first place. Thus, we are better off seeking the admission of acquitted
sexual assault conduct at trial, 186 where it is subject to the usual due
process safeguards. Examples of other due process-crime control
options include changing statutory offense definitions, 8 7 and increasing
the use of victim impact statements.1
8 8
The alternative is to risk future trials being increasingly overhauled
by the infusion of a preponderance of evidence standard at sentencing.
This could ultimately make trials mere formalities, or gateways, to get to
the "real" issues at a lower standard of proof. The outcome would be to
enable the state to use the first trial in which the defendant was acquitted
as a "dry run" before going to trial again. 189 In drafting the Guidelines
and moving toward a hybrid real-offense and charge-offense system, the
Commission acknowledged such risks and sought to reduce the potential
for prosecutors to influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the
number of counts in indictments.190
In very real terms, the admission of prior acquittals serves as a
floodgate for the admission of societal prejudices which the presumption
of innocence operates to exclude. The structural implications of opening
that floodgate, like poisoning an inkwell, is that "innocent" acquitted
people will be punished for offenses they did not commit simply because
society customarily assumes that acquittal is synonymous with a "bad
185. See Katherine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 563, 584 (1997).
186. See, e.g., FED. R. Evto. 404(b) (under certain circumstances, prior acquittals are
admissible at trial).
187. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1099-1100 (1986) (arguing that considering
consent from the defendant's perspective benefits rape victims, because it "substantially
undermines the relevance of the woman's sexual history where it was unknown to the man," and
relieves the victim from having to "prove" she was raped). See id. at 1099-1100. See also
Herman, supra note 115, at 294-95 ("Why should most of the factors listed in the Guidelines
Manual be treated as sentencing factors at all rather than elements of the relevant offenses?").
188. See, e.g., United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding proper the
sentencing court's consideration of victim impact statements made by some twenty-seven
investors who lost money in the defendant's mail fraud scheme, where such statements were made
in a dignified, non-inflammatory manner, subject to the defendant's ample opportunity to cross-
examine live witnesses and rebut written statements).
189. See Cynthia L. Randall, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal Collateral Estoppel and the
Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 284 (1992). See also Herman, supra note
115, at 289.
190. See SENTENciNG GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A. § 4(a). But see Herman, supra
note 115, at 311-14 (critiquing the Commissioner's modified real-offense system).
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verdict."19' Thus, acquittal comes to serve as a negative mark against
the defendant, instead of a meaningless zero. 192 In this sense, the danger
of admitting acquitted conduct is that its admission, in itself, signifies
relevance and becomes an imprimatur of guilt.1 93 The classic example
of this is the admission of prior acquitted rape conduct: "If jurors come
to expect prior act evidence, jurors may start to view the absence of prior
acts as evidence cutting against the likelihood that the accused is a 'rap-
ist."'1 94 Similarly, sentencing judges may view the absence of prior
sexual assault acts as evidence that the accused does not fit a so-called
"rapist" profile. This prejudice is likely to benefit rape defendants with
no past acquittals or convictions. As Professor Katharine Baker puts it:
"There is little doubt that many men have benefitted from a background
myth of good character ('nice boys don't rape')."
19 5
In the same vein, increased judicial discretion and the use of acquit-
ted conduct at sentencing implicates racial concerns. Professor Baker
cites Michael Tonry for the proposition that, "when [the] criminal justice
system ignores the foreseeable racially disparate impact of crime-control
measures," it is abrogating moral responsibility to its own detriment-
or: "The text may be crime. The subtext is race."' 96 Statistics indicate
that crime by blacks is not increasing, while disproportionate punish-
191. Johnson, supra note 21, at 198 ("The 'bad verdict' objection represents an implicit
conclusion that achievement of a 'correct' sentencing outcome outweighs the process values
represented by the jury system."). "Bad verdicts" supposedly occur due to "technicalities," or
even jury racial bias: "The justice system at times functions as a vehicle for paybacks for the
gross inequities in our society-for example, trading off Simpson and Reginald Denny acquittal
verdicts for Rodney King defendant acquittals." Bryan Morgan, The Jury's View, 67 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 983, 988 (1996).
192. Pernell makes use of an apt metaphor from Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventure in
Wonderland: "[T]here's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all." Pernell,
supra note 73, at 415.
193. "Justice Brennan ultimately concluded [in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342
(1990)] that whenever evidence from a prior acquittal is introduced and the defendant must
relitigate its underlying facts, an unacceptable risk exists for the jury to conclude erroneously that
he is actually guilty of that prior offense." Ronald A. Goldstein, Note, Double Jeopardy, Due
Process, and Evidence from Prior Acquittals: Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990),
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1027, 1033-34 (1990). But see Weber, supra note 14, at 470
(arguing that admission of acquitted conduct may in fact be more reliable than prior uncharged
conduct in that "facts from prior acquittals are given under oath, are subject to cross-examination,
may originate from a disinterested witness, and are espoused under the watchful eye of a judge
who can observe the witnesses' manner and demeanor.").
194. Baker, supra note 185, at 568. Professor Baker's article is in response to the addition of
Rule 413 to the Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 413 makes prior sexual assault acts by rape
defendants admissible in criminal sexual assault trials. See FED. R. EvD. 413.
195. Baker, supra note 185, at 591.
196. Id. at 596-97 (quoting MIcHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr: RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)).
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ment of blacks is. 197 At the same time, acquittal itself is being painted
as race motivated:
In 1993, the national acquittal rate for all defendants in criminal jury
trials was 17%. In the Bronx, where juries are 80% Black and His-
panic, the acquittal rate for Black defendants was 48%, and the
acquittal rate for Hispanic defendants was 38%. In Washington,
D.C., where juries are 70% Black and criminal defendants are 95%
Black, the acquittal rate was 29%. In Detroit, where Blacks are the
predominant members of juries, the acquittal rate was 30%. 198
In a racialized society where criminal defendants are disproportionately
black, perhaps it is no coincidence that the rhetoric of innocence in the
criminal arena has been replaced by a rhetoric of guilt-a rhetoric of
"other."
In many ways, the Court's decision in Watts paves the way for a
two-tiered trial system. 199 Such a system is not too far from the purview
of section 6A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to wit: "More formality
is ... unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate and fair[,]
[a]lthough lengthy sentencing hearings should seldom be necessary."
The outcome of a two-tiered system would affect the whole judicial sys-
tem. It could lead to pronged jury verdicts at different levels of proof,
and, in turn, could eradicate relitigation of criminal cases for civil dam-
ages. Thus, for example, in a case where the government failed to prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury could acquit a criminal
defendant, but at the same time, issue a preponderance of the evidence
verdict holding him civilly liable.
Alternatively, as some writers have suggested, sentencing courts
could admit evidence that does not contradict a prior jury's finding.
Thus, collateral estoppel would apply only to ultimate facts which the
prior jury's acquittal necessarily rejected.2" Admitting, at sentencing,
evidence that is in sync with a prior judge's findings might prevent the
erosion of public confidence in the criminal justice system while pro-
moting respect for jury verdicts.20 1 The problem with admitting such
evidence is that it would displace the state's burden of production onto
the defendant. Moreover, it is often unclear why juries acquit, and as
with past acquittals, sentencing judges would be limited to forming a
197. Baker, supra note 185, at 597 (citing TONRY, supra note 196, at 4). For further discussion
of the criminal system's disproportionate impact on black defendants, see generally TONRY, supra
note 196, at 4.
198. Morgan, supra note 191, at 984.
199. See Forde, supra note 14, at 386-88 (describing how, to some extent, sentencing has
become a second trial in itself, minus the safeguards: "This phenomenon, by which Guidelines
sentencing often overshadows trials, has been compared by some to 'the tail wagging the dog."').
200. See, e.g., Delao, supra note 126, at 1052; Kirchner, supra note 14, at 824.
201. See Kirchner, supra note 14, at 823-24; Johnson, supra note 21, at 183-86.
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reasonable inference from the record in light of the verdict.2 °2 Even
when the reasons for acquittal are clear, those reasons may serve an
important purpose which would be undermined by introduction at sen-
tencing.2 °3 For example, acquittal may be the result of the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence that is considered fruit of the poisonous tree
under the Fourth Amendment.204 As one writer recently pointed out, the
effectiveness of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a deterrent
to illegal searches is undermined if judges do not apply the rule at sen-
tencing.20 5 By the same token, the effectiveness of the presumption of
innocence as a safeguard of the individual's right to a fair trial is under-
mined if the presumption is discarded with respect to acquitted conduct
at sentencing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In his concurrence in Watts, Justice Breyer suggested that even if
the Supreme Court majority's interpretation of the Guidelines was cor-
rect, based on a literal reading of the current Guidelines, the Commis-
sion should revisit the matter and make an ultimate determination on the
use of acquittal in sentencing, in light of the centrality of acquittals to
our criminal system.2"6 By the same token, I would urge jurists to con-
sider seriously the outcome being guarded against by the presumption of
innocence.2 7 Admittedly, the real-life implications of using acquitted
conduct at sentencing seem remote. Nevertheless, the presumption of
guilt, which underlies its use, is closer than comfort. It sends the
message that accusations alone import guilt; that no one can remain
innocent.20 8 Ultimately, our judicial system must overcome its
prejudices and acknowledge the sanctity of acquittal verdicts: "The
criminal goes free if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. ' 2°
SANDRA K. WOLKOV
202. Even those who are present during the jury deliberations may never know, with absolute
certainty, the basis for the jury's verdict.
203. See generally Forde, supra note 14 (arguing that excluding illegally seized evidence from
trial, but permitting its use at sentencing, decreases the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule on police and prosecutors).
204. See Wong-Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
205. See Forde, supra note 14, at 481.
206. See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct 633, 638-39 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
Johnson, supra note 21, at 155 (espousing his principal thesis that the Commission should amend
the Guidelines to eliminate the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing); Kirchner, supra note 14, at
810-23 (analyzing the policies for and against using acquitted conduct in sentencing).
207. See Forde, supra note 14, at 488.
208. This message trickles down into the civil arena, where cases settle and leave an indelible
smear on the accused.
209. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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